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Nest eggs: Farmer savings 
accounts of various types 
have been posed as a 
potential solution to cycli-
cal income problems for 
years. Will the next Farm 
Bill actually cross the 
Rubicon and include some 
form of FSA program? 
BY MARK A. EDELMAN, JAMES MONKE. AND RON DURST 
D espi[e a largely meri[ed repurn[ion for rhrifr, farmers in rhe Uni[ed Srares do nor generally save for bad rimes. In conrrasr, Canada encour-
ages farmer saving by ma[ching [heir deposi[s and pro-
viding inreresr rare bonuses. In Ausrralia, a relarively 
new program allows farmers ro defer ra.xes on savings 
deposirs in good years so rhe savings can be wirhdrawn 
ar lower ra..x rares during poor years. Al[hough Congress 
has debared farmer savings conceprs off and on since 
1996, rhe Un ired Srares has nor yer implemenred a spe-
cific farmer savings accounr program. However, a sav-
ings program may emerge, ei[her in rhe 2002 Farm Bill 
debare or as parr of a broader ra..x package. We describe 
four possible savings accounr conceprs ro show rhe poren-
rial role rhar farmer savings incenrives mighr play in 
furure U.S. farm policy. 
Option 1: Net Income Savings Accounts 
(NISA) 
Canada implememed a Ner Income Savings Accounr 
program in 1991. Under rhe program, a farmer who 
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makes a deposir inro a NISA accounr recei\•es a gov-
ernmem marching deposir up ro rhree percenr of Eligi-
ble Ner Sales (ENS) - defined as gross sales of quali-
fyi1~g commodiries less purchases of seed , planrs, and 
livesrock. The Canadian governmenr rhen pays a rhree 
percenr inreres[ ra[e bonus over local bank rares on all 
NISA deposi[s. 
The maximum ENS eligible for marching is limired 
ro C$250,000 per year per farming enriry, so rhe max-
imum ma[ch is C$7,500 per year. Farmers can deposir 
up ro 20 percenr of ENS per year wirhour a governmenr 
marching deposir. Each enri[y is subjecr ro a maximum 
NISA balance of 1.5 rimes rhe 5-year average ENS. 
Unused deposir allocarions can be carried forward for up 
ro five years. 
NISA wirhdrawals can be made under eirher an 
"Income Srabilizarion" rrigger when rhe farmer's cur-
renr year gross margin falls below [he average gross mar-
gin for rhe five previous years. (Gross margin is roughly 
analogous ro [he IRS's Schedule F Gross Farm Income.) 
Alrernarively, wi[hdrawals can be made under a "Min-
imum lncome"rrigger when rhe farmer's currenc nee 
income from all sources falls below a chreshold level -
C$20,000 per individual or C$35,000 per family. 
NlSA is a voluncary program, used by slighcly more 
chan half of all Canadian farmers. Farmers may leave 
and rejoin under specific rules, and are required co ope 
our if rhey quir farming or rerire. NISA does nor replace 
ocher Canadian farm income pro-
and governmenc marching deposir incc;>ncivcs. Similar rn 
FARRM accouncs, IRMA deposirs are deduccible from 
pre-rax income. Deposics and inceresc are raxable only 
upon wichdrawal. A farmer would voluncarily deposic a 
minimum of cwo percenc of Schedule F gross farm 
income each year inro an IRMA accoum. The federal gov-
ernmen c would rhen make a rwo percent marching 
IRfv!A deposir. 
grams. Subsidized crop insurance 
and governmenc funded N!SA 
incencives are farm program main-
s rays norrh of che border. While 
Canada mainrains an ongoing 
supplemental disascer assisrance 
program , ir does nor provide farm 
supporrs analogous co Agricul-
rural Marker Transirion Ace 
(AMTA) paymenrs and Com-
modiry Loan Programs. 
Option 2: Farm and 
Ranch Risk M anagement 
(FARRM) Accounts 
Although Congress 
has debated farmer 
savings concepts off 
and on since 1996, 
the United States has 
not yet implemented 
a specific farmer 
savings account 
program. 
IRMA is viewed as a cool for 
self-insurance. Therefore, IRMA 
farmers can expecr ro receive gov-
ernment subsidies rough.ly equiv-
alent ro rhose who benefit from 
subsidized crop insurance. How-
ever, IRMA parricipanrs are 
expecred ro deposir contriburions 
similar ro rhose made by farmers 
who purchase crop insurance pre-
miums . Farmers receive cara-
srrophic c rop insurance (CAT) 
coverage under IRMA: bur any 
U.S. proposals for Farm and Ranch Risk Manage-
menc (FARR.iv!) accouncs originally appeared during 
che 1996 Farm Bill debace. Under FARRM, rhere are no 
marching deposits, inreresr race bonuses, or income rrig-
gers for wichdrawals. Instead , deferred taxes encourage 
farmer savings account deposits . Farmers would make 
FARRM accounr deposits as an additional deduction 
from pre-tax income . Deposits would be held in inrer-
esr-bearing accounts a r approved financial insriwrions. 
Interest earnings would be disrribured ro lhe farmer 
and raxable in rhe year earned. Wirhdrawals from 
FARRM accounts would be made ar che farmer's dis-
crecion and r~nable in rhe year wirhdrawn. 
Under rhe mosr recenr proposal, farmers could 
deposit up co 20 percent of eligible ner farm income 
annually. While there are no Ii mies on account balances, 
FARRM deposirs could only sray in rhe accounr for up 
co five years, wirh deposirs nor wirhdrawn in 5 years 
incurring a I 0 percem pen airy. Wichdrawal of FARRM 
funds would be required if rhe accounr holder did nor 
farm for [WO consecucive years. 
Option 3: Individual Risk Management 
Accounts (IRMAs) 
Individual Risk Managemenr Accounrs (IRMAs) are 
voluncary and conrain ;l combination of deferred rax 
addirional crop insurance pur-
chased by an IRMA parricipanr may nor be subsidized. 
Similar ro NISA, farmers can maincain maximum 
IRMA balances of no more rhan I 50 percent of rhe 
rheir 3-year average Schedule F Gross Farm Income. 
Farmers may withdraw only during years when rheir 
Schedule F Gross Farm Income falls bdow 80 percenr 
of rhe average for rhe previous rhree years, and rhe wirh-
drawal can only be used ro bring rhe income up ro rhe 
80 percent level. 
Option 4: Farm Program Payment 
Reserve (FPPR) Accounts 
A fourrh alrernarive is similar ro rhe FARRM accounr 
concept inrroduced in 1996. Under rhis oprion, AMTA 
payments are linked and diverred ro savings accounts ro 
build safery ner reserves for individual farmers. If such 
FPPR accounrs had been in effect in 1996, payments in 
rhe high-income years ( 1996 and 1997) would have 
generared savings accounr balances so rhar each farmer 
receiving AMTA paymenrs would have had a safery ner 
during rhe lower income years char followed . 
If an FPPR-like plan specifies rhar 50 percent of 
furure AMTA payments and orher fixed farm program 
paymenrs musr be deposired inro FPPR accounts in rhe 
name of each program parricipanr, rhe plan would con-
verr half of rhe fixed paymenrs inro a counrer-cyclical 
paymcnr program. 
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Similar ro NISA, FPPR accounts could be capped ar 
150 percent of rhe farmer's five-year average Schedule F 
gross farm income. Farm program payments would revert 
direcdy ro rhe farmer when he or she reaches rhe FPPR 
account maximum. Withdrawals could be criggered when 
currem year gross farm income falls below rhe farmer's 
average for rhe previous five years. A farmer 
would be eligible to withdraw up to rhe dif-
ference berween the current year's gross farm 
income and rhe five-year average. 
What's at Stake for 
Stakeholders 
Savings programs can help farmers man-
age risks and create a personal financial 
safety net. To the degree that the farmer's net savings 
increase, assets accumulate and the farmer's investment 
portfolio becomes more diversified. The program also 
represems a form of self-insurance that builds assets rather 
than adding premium expense. However, the level of 
exposure to risk depends on the previous accumulation 
of each farmer's reserve balances. 
Farmer savings account incentives represent one 
approach to meeting the emerging WTO criterion of 
supporting farmers in a non-trade-distorting manner. 
The payments and incentives are not linked to crop-
specific prices or levels of production. In addition, farm 
program parameters based on farm income may become 
a more useful rool as the structure of agriculture and 
the food system shifts away from commodity prices on 
open markets and roward contracting and integrated 
value-added product markets . 
Taxpayers and consumers are potentially imerested in 
such concepts because farmers may come ro rely more 
on safery nets that reduce reliance on government dis-
aster programs or subsidized insurance programs. 
The various consequences for each of the four farmer 
savings accoum programs are listed in Table 1. A com-
parison of the participation, farm management, pro-
gram impact, and fiscal attributes of the four concepts 
emphasizes the trade-offs among them. 
FARRM, the most widely discussed U.S. proposal, 
would likely generate rhe least farmer participation. 
However, proposals that generate greater voluntary par-
ticipation likely require greater monetary incemives such 
as matching paymems and interest rate bonuses. Deposit 
and withdrawal requirements may be less popular in 
farm country but do more ro assure taxpayers that a 
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safery net is conscructed during good times with ade-
quate reserves for use during the poor years. 
The key policy issue ro emerge from comparing rhe 
four alternatives is ro derermine rhe priority of goals for 
the farmer savings accoum incemives. Should the pri-
mary goal of rhe incemives be ro mal(e AMTA payments 
more coumer-cyclical, ro provide a supple-
memal risk managemem rool, ro foster self-
insurance as a substitute for subsidized crop 
insurance, or ro build safery net reserve bal-
ances that reduce the need for future ad hoc 
disaster programs? The level of agreemem on 
policy goals is likely to shape the design and 
the choice of the option that provides the best 
fit in terms of its intended consequences. 
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